Freebie Schemes: A Threat To Constitutional Principles? A Critical Analysis Of Electoral Populism, Welfare State And Fiscal Constitutionalism In India
Mr. Sourav KarSeptember 18, 202610.5281/zenodo.22829248Pages 1–16 (16 pages)
Abstract
The freebie economy is emerging as a contemporary threat to Constitutional Principles. Increasing prominence of “freebie politics” in Indian elections has generated an important Constitutional debate concerning the relationship between welfare governance and electoral competition. The consistent promise of cash transfers, free electricity, subsidised goods and services, loan waivers, free transport, financial assistance and other material benefits in election manifestos by the political parties in the name of development or advancement and social justice in furtherance of Directive Principles of State Policy, is creating serious concerns relating the free and fair elections, equality, public accountability, fiscal responsibility and inter-generational justice. The constitutional difficulty lies in distinguishing legitimate welfare measures from electoral inducements. Generally the judiciary has no power to interfere with the economy policy of the State. However in 2013 the Supreme Court raised a serious concern regarding the voter’s manipulation while denying it as a corrupt practice and direct to modify the Model Code of Conduct to the Election Commission of India. Therefore judiciary accepted the principle that welfare promises cannot be prohibited merely because they involve public expenditure, rather it is permitted while maintaining electoral purity. This article argues that the constitutional answer does not lie in an absolute prohibition of welfare expenditure. Rather, India requires a constitutional and institutional framework that distinguishes rights-based welfare from electorally targeted freebies through the tests of public purpose, rationality, fiscal sustainability, transparency and electoral influence. Applying the Doctrinal Analytical Legal Research and by using various Primary and Secondary Sources it proposes an institutional legal framework, mandatory fiscal-impact statements, electoral manifesto guidelines, strengthened Election Commission guidelines, independent fiscal scrutiny, post-election manifesto accountability and greater legislative regulation.
References
References are included in the full PDF.