MORAL RIGHTS IN AI-GENERATED VOCAL PERFORMANCES: INTERPRETING SECTION 57 OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT, 1957 ALONGSIDE EMERGING PERSONALITY RIGHTS IN THE WAKE OF ARIJIT SINGH V. CODIBLE VENTURES LLP

Abstract

Current developments in generative artificial intelligence and voice cloning pose a risk to the livelihood of vocal artists and leave huge gaps in current IP law. This paper explores the interim order of Arijit Singh v Codible Ventures LLP (2024) and the lack of adequate structures in India's copyright regime. The Bombay High Court limited the unauthorised algorithmic copies but faced difficulty in not referring to the copyright text but rather common-law personality rights and the right to privacy under Article 21. This detour shows that there is a very important “double lacuna”. The first is that moral rights, as defined by the Copyright Act 1957, are apparently linked to "works that exist prior to the creation of the copyrighted work. The result is a large divide in the realm of synthetic copyright. The second is that Sections 38A and 38B will have the effect of limiting the rights of performers to fixed or live performances. That means that non-celebrity performers are not protected. This paper will also analyse a number of global legal systems, including the UK, the EU and the USA, to see how potential solutions can be identified, and the author's suggestion of a universal non-waivable right of publicity that would ensure a high standard of ‘fair dealing’, in order to safeguard the dignity of artists and consumers