ANTI-DEFECTION LAWS IN INDIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TENTH SCHEDULE

Abstract

This paper critically examines the evolution, constitutional framework, and practical functioning of India's anti-defection law under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. It traces the historical circumstances leading to the enactment of the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985, highlighting the political instability and rampant defections that undermined parliamentary democracy. The study analyzes the legal provisions governing disqualification, the role of the Speaker as the adjudicating authority, and the impact of the Ninety-First Amendment in strengthening the law. It further evaluates leading judicial decisions, including Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya, and Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra, to assess judicial interpretation of the anti-defection regime. The paper argues that while the legislation has succeeded in reducing opportunistic individual defections and promoting governmental stability, it has simultaneously curtailed legislative independence, strengthened party leadership at the expense of deliberative democracy, and enabled procedural manipulation through delays in disqualification proceedings. By examining recent political controversies and comparative constitutional perspectives, the study identifies structural weaknesses in the existing framework and proposes reforms, including independent adjudication of disqualification petitions, statutory timelines for decision-making, and limiting the operation of the party whip to confidence motions and other matters affecting government stability. The paper concludes that meaningful reform is essential to reconcile political stability with democratic accountability and the constitutional values of representative government.